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LL.

B.

One

of the most

risprudence

is

Corporations,"

that

important branches

department known as,

which-is

everywhere

and more demanding the attention
because

of' !hn active part it

L aw of

"The

and every day more

of thinkin6 people,
new takes

business enterprises of the present
It

of our legal ju-

may t,-uly be said that in

in

nearly all

century.

early colonial times,

there were no business corporations of any description.
The clot,ing

worn was

either imported from foreign coun-

t-ies, or' consisted of home-spun garments,which were almost universally made

by hand,thus

necessity

Ur manufactories,while

telephone

companies had not

But,as the

railroad,tolegraph and

come

into existence.

laws of theination conrenced to extend over a

lariger expanse

of territory,the

and of the countr\
which,the

yet

doing away with the

itself

condition of the people
be 'an to change,as a result

laws of the nation and of the separate

of

states

have been continually developing,new ones being added and
old ones amended or stricken out,as best served the purposes of the times.

With the growth of the

comnercial

interests,came a cry for the revision and extens on of

the laws of commiierce.

1.1oreover,as business

increased

and new inventions were -iscovered,capitalist s soon became
anxious to invest their money in profitable business enterprises,but unless they could to a certain extent be
protected by the law,they refused to so use t1leir capital.
But the old

saying that"where there is a will then is a

way" soon became

apparent

rations very soon
one of the most
In
endeavor

became

in this case,for the law of corpoestablished,ani to-day occupies

important branche; of our jurisprudence.

speaking of this
to treat

department

of the law,

of the whole subject at

toovast to permit

I

shall not

large as it

is

of my doing so; many volunes having

already been written upon it,althouh the law itself has
been in force but a short period of time.
fore

chosen as a fit

of the directors to
ing out

subject
the

I have

for discussion the

there-

relat

stock-holders,with a view to

ins
point-

,hat rights,if any,the minority stoch-holders have

or ought to have against the directors or other stock-holders for wrongs conTnitted by them.
and the nature

Whc

of their office,are the

we must necessarily devote our present
The directors may be said to

the directors are
questions to which
attention.

be themselves

o ,nmers of

stock ,of the

corporation.

stock-holders

to conduct

And are ,in
officer,

They are

chosen by the

the affairs

of the

other

organization.

one sense of the word,the Supreme mana'ing
thereof.

Unless a provision cf the statute,

or the charter or by-laws of the corporation places some
restriction upon them,their po,,rer inay be Faid to be one
of almost unlimited jurisdiction.

When spoken of 'vrith

reference to t-~e rel2ticns which exist between them and
the other stockholders ,they are -niversally mentione.l as
trustees.

They are not however in a strict sense true

trustees either with the corporation or the
themselves
the legal
stock is
In

as their true
title

"cestuis que trust" since neither

to the corpor :tion prorerty nor to the

vested in
ex parte

stockholders

them.

Chippoendale,4 DeG.M.

', GI,

Turner J.

speaking of the relations between the directors and the
company

said:
"Although directors undoubtedly stand in the

position of agents

and cannot bind their company

beyond the limits of their authority,they also stand
in mme degree in the position of trustees.

There

is no inconsistency in this double view of the Position
of directors.

They are agents and cannot bind

their company beyond their powers.

They are trustees

-4
and are entitled to be indemnified for expenses incurred by a them within the limits or' their trust.

They

are bound to obse-ve the limits placed upon their
And ,if

powers in the charter.

limits and cause damage,they

they transcend such

incur liability.

If they

act fraudulently,or do a willful wronj,it is not
doubted that they muy be held for all the damage they
cause.

But,if they act in good faith within the

limits of their powers,using proper prudence and
diligence,they are not responsible for mere mistakes
or errors of judgment."
The board of directors of a corporation do not stand in
the same relation to the corporate body which a private
agent holds toward his principal.

In the first place,

in the strict relation of' principal an
authority v'ich the latter

Secondly,

of the directors
undelegated.

in corporate bodies the powers

are in a very important sense original and

Neither do the stockholders confer,nor can

they revoke these powers.
the sense

empowered to exercise is

from an express or implied delegation from

deriyed either
the former.

is

agent ,all the

of being

They are derivative only in

received from the state

,being

embodied

in

-5-

the articles of incorporation.

When convene! as a board,

the directors are the primary posessors of all the powers
which the charter confers.
"Indeed joint

Chief Justice

Hin-man says:

stock cumpanies in modern times

are nothing but commercial partnerships,which have
taken the form of corporations for the greater facility
of transacting business,and to prevent a dissolution
of the concern by those numerous events which are so
liable to wo-k a dissolution of a partnership

composed

of a greater number of individuals."
They must hiave applied to them principleR making them
accountable like all trastees,or the

;rievance would be

intolerable ,since otherwise a majority of the stockholders
acting through the directors,who would thus cease to be

in

fact what the law considers them--the agents of the whole
body of stockholders--and

ould become the private agents

of the reajoritymight set the minority at defiance and
manage the affairs for th~ir own supposed benefit and the
benefit of the majority Yho appointed them.

"Pratt vs. Pratt

Co.,33 Corn 453."
But,whatever,the relations between the parties may be,
and whether the directors and managers of corporations can
in a strict sense be

called trustees or notthere can be

no doubt but that their character is a fiduciary one,they

-6-

being entrusted by others \fith powers which are to oe
exercised for the conmmon and gener; 2 interests
benefit.

ration and not for their own Iivate
Such directors or rmanaers

of the corpo-

are

in

fact both trustees and

agents of the bodies represented by them.

They fall

fore within the rule which juards and restrains the

theredealings

and transactions between trustee and cestui que trust,and
agent and his principal.
c&ple

And also within the great prin-

by ,rhich equity requires that confidence

be abused by the party in whom it
equity this r-

c

y t'ies

is

-eposed.

shall not
This rule

to enforce by imposing a

.iisability either partial or complete upon the party interested,to deal on his o',n behalf in
involved in such confidence.

respect to any matter

Hence -t is impossi)le for

us to limit the duties of a director or manager of a corporation in

this respect to some particular event:

as focr

instance while they are acting as directors or managers
under any special delegation of power or are in
meetings of' the board.

attendance of

Such a limit to the general scope

ef the rule ,-ould deprive it

of almost all

its value and

usefulness,and would open an easy avenue of escape,thus
facilitating innumerable evasions of its force.

Justice

Johnson in the case of Hoyle vs. Plattsburg R.R.

Co.,

-754 11I.1.,314 said:
"The

fact

that

the powers of a director to act

for or to represent the corporation may be so
in respect

limited

to its being bound by his acts,does not

f irnish any ground for sayin," that his fiduciary
capacity and consequent
same li-,it.
KcKx±xk(

continues.

On the

dutied

are subsequent to the

contrary,thesemust be held to

continue so long as his directorship
Mo reovermany of our large

and most

useful enterprises of the present day as
variety of the diffbrent

well as a

branches of business

require

for their existence and successful prosecution a
large and permanent

investment

of capital.

are usually and most conveniently

established and

managed by meana of corporate organization.
affairs
tions
of the

of these corporations
intrusted to the

The

are,with but fe',, excep-

exclusive

board of directors.

These

management and control

Hence from thevery nature

of their position,there is an inherent

obligation

im, lied in the acceptance of such trust,not only that
they will use their best efforts

to promote the

inter-

est of the share-holders ,but that they will in no
manner use their positions to advance their c-rn indi-

-8vidual interests

as distinguished from that of the

corporation.
interests
the

in

fair

Also,that

the corporation that will conflict

and proper

Stor, 's

Equity

discharge

of their

Jurisprudence,Sec.

"That trustees

not

powers,and manage

,wlith

duties."

455 4,

and persons standinj in

ciary capacity,shall
their

they will not acquire any

be permitted

similar fiduto exercise

or appropriate

of which they have control for their

provides:

the property

own profit

or

emolument V
Or,as
of their

it

is

situation

sometimes

expressed,sh:ll not

to obtain any personal benefit

selves at the expense of their
mate
is

the pecuniary profit

which

it

is

realize to each of its in-lividual members.

advantage

to them-

cestui que trust.

object for which every ordinary business

formed,is

take

The ulticorporation
expected to

These profits,

usualln called dividends,must of necessity be paid out of
the fund which remains
the expenses
upon this

exclusive

of the capital

of the business have been paid.

subject appears

to me

stc-k,after
The doctrine

to be very fairly and

correctly stated by Chancellor Walworth

in his opinion

rendered

Insurance

in

the

case of

Scott vs.

7 Paige,2O3,whe-e he says:

Eagle

Co pany,

-I11-

"As the directors
discretion

in

are bound to exercise

making dividends

of surplus

a proper

profits,if

they abuse that power of' dividing the unearned premiuris,witho.it
the capital

leaving a

sufficicmt

stock to satisfy

fund exclusive

the p'obable

in case of any extraordinary loss,which
to exhaust the whole
personally liable

creditors

losses,they rm:y

is sufficient

capital and more,make

to the

of

themselves

of the company.

On

The other hand,should they without reasonable cause
refuse to divide what

is actually surplus profits,the

stockholders are not without a remedy

if they apply

to the proper tribunal before the corporation has
become

insolvent.

But to d-etermine what the actual
is
profits of the corporation are
often a matter of
practical difficulty.

Much of the confusion which

arise- ds owing to the fact tha

a proper distinction

is not made between the capital stock and the profits."
The term

' capital st(ck"

revised statutes,page

in the provision of the

60I,S c. 2,prohioiting the directors

of a company from making" any dividends except from the
surplus profits of a corporation,or from
ing or in any ,ray paying to the
the

:ividing,withdraw-

stockholders any part of

capital stock of such corporation,means the property of

-Is-

the corporation contributed by the stock-holders,or otherwise

obtained to the extent required by its
Vice Chancellor Sanford in the

Merchant's Exchange Company,makes

e

charter.

case of' Barry
clea-

v.

and precise

dis-

/

tinction between these terms,renderin6 extremely simple
that which at first seemed to be

difficult.

capital stock of a corporation is like
ship or joint

stck

He says the

that of a co-partner-

company,the amount which the partners or

associates put in as their share

in the

concern.

To this

they add upon the credit of the company,from the means and
resources of others,to such extent as their own prudence
or the confidence of such other persons will permit.
additions create a debt;

they do not form capital.

Such
If

successful in their career,the surplus over and above their
capital becomes profits,and is either divided among the
partners and associates or use., still further to
their

extent

operations.
I

Sanfo-d's

Chancery,307.

From what has already been said it will readily be
inferred that

the power of distributing

the surplus profits

of the business among the stockholders lies almost entirely
within the discretion of the directors.

Upon them rests

the duty

of saying whether dividends
when they

be declared;
amount

that

shall

declared;

be so

Except

to be divided.

is

shall. ,r

shall rint
as well as the
cases

those

in

where

their authority is restricted either by statute or the
articles of incorporation,their power according to the
law is without liriitation and free from restraint.

present

They are at

as to the manner
the

corporation

qct in
thu

in

is

discretion

of the business

be disposed of.

absolute.

of

So long as they

honest judgment,their

of ai

jutjrment approves

ever their

very liberal

profits

which the

shall

the exercise

disposal

repairs

to exercise a

liberty

They may reserve
as necessary

power over

of them what-

or judicious

for

and improve:lents to the buildings or machinery,or

to meet continJencies,both present and r'vspective which
they think may possibly arise.
Their determination
if

made

in

good faith

in

respect to

these matters,

and for honest ends,thouji

the

result

may show that it was injudicious,is final,and not subject
to judicial censure.

But,as the cirectors themselves

usually hold the majority of the stock,it

very often happens

that they refuse to declare dividends when

they can lawf.lly

do so.

Their object

those whIe are not 'rithin

in so doiD5
the

seems to be to compel

-ing or combination,to

sell

- 1.their

stock;

or,as

it

is

these poor unfortunates
fully

belongs

usually expressed,they
by hcldir;

to them.

back that which ri3ht-

After this

freezinj

process or mild

form of coercion has proved successful,an_
or their

friends have .jotten

tions which first
perous

proved a

freeze out

wen

the ,9irectors

control of the stock,corporafailure,soon spring into pros-

e-terprises°

To accomplish their purpose an.! at the same tive
escale

the clutches

of the law,they are very careful to

have thei" actions appear for

and not for any individual member.

Besides the

reserving the srplus

to make

ally

ones,the directors

purely ima.:inary

property for
object bein!;

'hich they -ay
to "id

Another meth¢0

the

the interest of

company

saheme

improvements,,,hich

are

-resorted to is

ener-

sometimes buy

an exhorbitant price,their

themselves

of

of the su-(olus

main

profits.

to either increase

t. e salary

of the present officers of the corporation or to establish
ne>r ones

,iith

Zpigier v.

large

salaries

attached.

Hoagland,5 N.Y.

less than half

the stock

owned the residue.
the three trustees

in

Sur.

305,

In

the

caseof

the plaintiff

owned

a corporation and the defendant

For many years plaintiff
constituting the board,but

was

one of

the defendants,

who were all of one family,were also elected tlustees,and

and they

elocted themselves respectively,President,Secre-

tary and treasurer.
plaintiff's

One oig the .Iefendants

steck,but he refuise,

cleferrdat

In

fifty

thousand,

a further

salaries

oi'ficers were

hirty

thousand and six

trustees

refusal
So

tG

sell

hat,instead

which had been paid

to receive respectively;

increase was threatened,with

the power of the

of the officers,

ise of salaries.

$I800.00 each per year--the

for mny years--the

;alaries

the next year,another

was followed by another r
of

to sell,whereupon said

threatened to raise the

which was Jone.

s( u ht to buy

to increase

thousand
the

:ollars

statement

the salaries

and
that

;ras

unlimited.
Another

company was controlled by the

same officers were

corporation,and the

chosen an-. they voted themselves

salaries

respectively of; S:,ven Thousand Five Hundred,Six Thousand
and One Thousand Dollars,though pr-eviously the
the company had se-ve2i without payi
concerns

,ias very profitable.

shown to be g-reater
court held that the

than the

real value

of the officers'

of

The business of both

The salaries

voted were

s:.rvices were worth.

action of the

and that qquity would restrain

oificers

trustees

The

was fraudulent

the psyment of more than the
services.

While the clear

intention of the defendants --ras to enforce

tie

laintiff

to retire from the
that

corporatiom,the court merely decided

in the p-esent case,they had adopte!

an illegal method

to accomplish their purpose,without passing upon the
question whether

the directors mist divide the surplus

earnings or not.

Thus,no

could still

upon them,they

havin" been placed

restrictions
refuse

to declare

dividends by

using the profits to mke so-called inprovements,or
paying exhorbitant
plishin5 their
This

object,althou;h

in

a

slightly

which

forced net only tc relinquish not

fair

who are

the stockholders

only their

the surplusbut are also compelle3, to sell
beti-e from the corporation.

It

time accom-

different

case will serve to give us but a

of the manner in
are

prices for land,at the same

by

their

manner.

illustration
in

a minority

claims

to

stock and

is a fundamental prin-

ciple of business that unless stock investments are paying
dividends,the market value of the stock
and soon becomes practically unsalable.

itself

depreciates

Thus the

-directors

by refusing to Jlivide the profits,not only accomplish thoi '
pu--pose Of freezinj

out those who:cannot

the corpovation,but they also give
impression that

tc

afford to stay

the outsi:ie worl,'

in
the

the corporation is a non-paying onethereby

enabling them to buy these stockholders' shares at.a discount
from the real

value.

With such a
it

is

state of affairs

indeed strange that

which

.vould not

occu ing almost

some

law has not

yet been passed

only act as a check upon the powers

directors but would also tend to
minority stockholders.
is ,I

daily,

tiiink,apparent

increase

of the

those of the

That the present, law is defective

to every

fair

minded person.

to remedy the wrong,and at the same

But how

time do justice

to the

largest merdW,is the difficult problem which we have to
solve.

For unless we move with great caution and pre-

cision,we are liable to
as

the

create a new evil equally as unjust

one which we are trying to remedy.

were to substitute for the present
the

directors must declare

ask for a

Therefore,if we

law,a provision that

dividends when the minority

division,provided

there be a surplus,it

would very

often happen that no pvovision would be made for future
contingencies,as a
likJ,

to go into

result

of which the corporation would be

insolvency.

That it is eften a wise

policy,as well as shrewd business management

to reserve

the surplus for actual expected contingencies or for the
purpose of making needed improvements is not denied.
as soon as

they employ these metho,-s

of benefitting the

not with the

But

intention

corporation itself,but simply to act as

a shield for themselves

while

lawful property,then

is

it

they deprive

others

that these stockholders

of their
have a

-17just
law

-ight
is

hat the powers

rations
and

to complain.

are

The difficiity
of directors

too extensive;

while

especially those who are in

with the present
ol. managers

(-f corpo-

those of the stockholders
a minority are not extensiv:

enough.
No doabt the

originators of the law thouit

Jifficulty would be
ject

averted by placing the

to the same rules

Indeed,many

containing dicta to the effect that
in

a

directors sub-

as an ordinary trustee would be when

holding a similar position.

stcckholders

this

cases

can be fcLund

thc minority

corporation have a remedy in

of the

chancery

against the directors,whethor individuals or corporations,
assisting

or confederating with them

to prevent

such

corporations and the directors thereof from making an#
misapplication of their capital o- profits,which might
result in cdiminishin6 the Dividends
value

of

what in

their
law is

shares,if
termed a

cases almost universally

the acts
breach

of stockholders or the

intended to be

of trust

-one

or duty.

create

These

contain clauses to the effect that

the directors will be held responsible for any misapplication of the surplus,but they do not provide that the
dividends must be declared though there is an actual profit
realized

from the business.

On the contrary,,they

]bave

themselveswho

seen,very often use their

as we have alreaiy

power to further
If

discretion of the directors

within the

entirely

this

some nefarious

a provision morlifying that part

which relates
corporations

-f

to the powers and priveleges

the present law
of officers

of

some more efficiont

should be rmde,whereby

theck could be placed upon the directors,thus

rest-icting

which we now encounter

powers,much of the difficulty

their

own.

of their

schemes

would henceforth be done away with.
In

attempting to solve what the nature of these

amendrments

be,we are at once

shall

confrente:

obstacles and difficulties,which

require

earnest and careful attention.

After

from us our most

due consideration

subject with a view to considering these

of this

plan which wouli at

least

encountered,if,indeed,it
plan is

difficulties

have ventured to suggest the followving

as much as possible,I

modify som

of the evils

did not abolish them.

now

The

as follows:

First,
shall

with numerous

The directors

of all

business

be appointed by the stockholders

in

the

co -porations
sane manner

as now provided for b" law.
Second,

These

directors

shall

be the managers

of the

-i9corporation, upon whom will rest the responsibility of seeing

that the business is carried on in a proper manner, and for
the interest of the stockholders at large rather than for any
one individual ,embor.
Third,

The relations between these directors and the

other stockholders shall be considered to be the same as
those which exist between a trustee and a cestui que trust,
any failure to faithfully perform their.duties to be considerd
as a breach of trust, and punished in like manner.
Fourth,

Before any improvements can be made either to

the buildings or machinery, or investments made in real estate
or other property the consent of two-thirds of all the stockholders must be first obtained.
Fifth,

The salary of no officer of the corporation

shall be increased nor no new office shall be created without
first obtaining the consent of two-thirds of the stock-holders
Sixth,

Before any loan of money shall bo made either to

the corporation or by the corporation, the consent of twothirds of all the stock-holders must be first obtained.
Seventh,

At the end of every year a meeting of all the

stock-holders shall be called to consider the advisability
of dividing the surplus, instead of leaving the question of
disposal entirely within the discretion of the directors as

provided for by the present law.
Eighth,

Whenever two-thirds of all the stock-holders

determine that a division of the surplus profits should be
made,

as well as the amount that should be distributed,

it

s

shall be the duty of the directors to declare such a dividend.
Ninth,

If

however the directors refuse to declare the

dividend, when they can legally do so, it shall be the duty
of the Judge of any Court of Record in this State, to appoint
a referee to investigate into the affairs of the corporation
whenever appealed too for assistance by a stockioholder of the
corporat ion.
Tenth,

Upon the referees finding that a dividend can

legally be declared it shall be his duty to command the
directors to declare such a dividend.
Eleventh,

Should any stock-holder refuse to accept his

propor!-ion of the surplus profits the amount of his share
shall be placed to his credit on the books of the corporation
and shall be considered as money advancedto the corporation
by said stock-holder, to secure payment of which, a bondomr
other evidence of debtsshall be issued by the corporation
to the stock-holder which shall bear the legal rate of interest
Twelvth,

At all meetings held to consider the advisabilutv

either of making improvements or investments, of increasing

-21-

the salaries of the officers,of loaning or borrowing money
or establishing new offices,or for declaring new dividends
as provided for by

sections four,five,six,seven,eight,nine,

and tenit shall be the duty of the treasurer of the corporation to nake and file a correct report concerning the financial condition of said corporation.
Thirteenth,

Should the treasurer through fraud or negli-

gencemake and file a report which is not an accurate statement of the financial condition of the corporation he shall
be held criminally liable for said offense.
Mr.Eugene D. Hawkins in his prize essay upon this subject
when speaking of the legislation that is needed for the protection of minority stockholders expresses himself in the
following manner:
"More adequate and summary protection from ultra vires
acts would be afforded minority stockholders if the charters
of corporations designated more specifically the powers conferred both upon the majority and the directors. If the right
of visitation were extended so as to compel corporations to
exibit their affairs to state boards of commissioners and to
apply to them as well as to a majority of stockholders before
exercising any unusual authority conferred by the charter the
minority stockholder would be safer than if alone,he were

obliged to fight his battle against the majority."
His suggestions concerning the charters of corporations is
an excellent oneand a-ly legislation tending to carry out his
intention in this respect would be a step in the right direc4m
tion.
Rut,as to the advisability of extending the right of
visitation

to State Boards of "ommissioners, I beg to disa-

gree with the learned gentleman for the following reasons;
Experience has already taught us that the work done and
good accomplished by these boards of conmissioners virtually
amounts to nothing.They make their annual tour of inspection,
hastily glance at the books of the concern, then depart to
another part of the state to visit some other corporation the
nature and object of whose bus-iness is entirely different from
that of the one they last visited.

Having completed their

journey,they proceed to head quartersmake out their reports,
and then do their only real work,viz;

draw their salaries,

a matter of importance which they never fail to perform.
Moreoverscarcely any two corporations keep their bcoks
exactly alikefor business men have their peculiarities,their
own ideas as to book-keeping.
It would thus be a matter of 'Very little difficulty for
the officers of the corporation to so keep their books as to

make

it almost

impossible to detect any evidence of fraud

except by the most careful and painstaking work of annexpert.
That the commissioners would not have time to do their
duty in such an instance,and that the officers would thus accomplish their wrongful purpose with comparative ease,is,I
think,clear

to every one.

Instead of having this

State Commission would it not be

preferableecuo have a committee

of the stockholders appointed

by their associateswhose duty would consist of examining the
books of the concern,and reporting the results of their investigation to their fellow members?

nertainly they would be

more liable to understand the manner in which the books were
kept,and would be interested to such an extent that they
would make every effort on their part to discover any signs
or indications of fraud.
11hile the suggestions I have made are probably defective
in many particularsyet should they or similar ones ever be
adopted into our corporate laws,many of the difficulties which
the corporate stockholders now encounter would be swept away.
Forby taking from the directors the power of having the
entire

control of the finances of the concern,and at the

same time giving this privelege to the

stockholders themselves

the chances for freezing out any member is made more diffi-

-24cult if not,indeed,quite impossible.
Firthermore,by increasing the power of the Courtsso that
they can interfere
for assistance b

in all cases where they are appealed to
the stockholders,a check would thus be

placed upon the directorsand many cases of unjust oppression
which we now encounter would be done away with.
If we stop to consider how large a part of the business
now done throughout the

country is accomplished by means of

corporations, the necessity of having this department of law
as just and reasonable as possible will be at once apparent
to all.
As the very key-stone

to the existence of our National

Government is the principle of distributing justice equally
among all its citizensit necessarily follows that our State
laws must also be founded upon the same principle.
Frank E. Thomas.

